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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature

Of The Case
Robert Scott Ashbey appeals from the judgments 0f conviction entered after he pled guilty

in three different cases.

Ashbey argues

that the district court erred

When

denied his motions to

it

suppress.

Statement

Of The

Facts

And Course Of The Proceedings

December 2018,

In

the

Coeur d’Alene Police Department was engaged

surveillance of an apartment. (TL, p.94, L.23

— p.95,

L.4.

location” (Tr., p.53, Ls.16-21), and the surveillance

Ashbey and William Mulkin] had been
doing surveillance” (TL, p.103, Ls.1-3;

On December

undercover ofﬁcer.
car

When

interstate

selling narcotics

ﬂ

car.

(Tr., p.95,

(Tr., p.61, Ls.9-12.)

Tr., p.61, Ls.2-8).

He

Ls.14-20.)

alerted

individuals leave the

Ofﬁcer Nordman, a second

Ofﬁcer Nordman followed the car and then stopped the

driver’s side

stopped her, and asked for her driver’s license.
getting her driver’s license out,

(EX.

The

0f the

A

at

car,

car pulled over

0:00

informed the driver

—

0n an

A at 0: 10 — 0:15.)

why he had

While the driver was

0110.2)

Ofﬁcer Nordman asked the passenger

probation and whether he had any identiﬁcation. (EX.

if

he was on parole or

The passenger

said he

A11 citations t0 the transcript refer t0 the electronic pagination of the transcript ﬁled in Appeal

N0. 4725 1
2

saw two unknown

(Tr., p.66, Ls. 10-23.)

Ofﬁcer Nordman approached the

1

that [Robert Scott

from the building Where they had been

the driver failed t0 use her turn signal. (Tr., p.61, Ls. 14-20.)

onramp.

undercover

The apartment was a “known narcotics

team “had information

21, 2018, an undercover ofﬁcer

apartment and get into a

1)

in

.

A11 citations to “EX.

introduced as Exhibit

A”

from Ofﬁcer Nordman’s bodycam, Which the defense
the suppression hearing. (Tr., p.53, L.22 — p.54, L20.)

refer to the Video

A at

was not 0n parole 0r probation and
0:20;

ﬂ

Ofﬁcer Nordman also asked for the driver’s

Tr., p.64, Ls.4-6.)

and she provided
his identiﬁcation.

it

to him.

(EX.

A

Nordman recognized him
p.63, Ls.15-20.)

(EX.

—

0:56

at

as

A at 0:24 — 0:45.)

registration

A at 0: 10 —

and insurance,

The passenger ultimately decided

(EX.

A

—

at 1:04

1:10;

At some point during the conversation, Ofﬁcer Nordman saw “a
.

.

.

between the front passenger’s

seat

He did not want either of them to reach for the weapon (Tr., p.67,

by were “merging onto

was

T11,

potential

Ls.16-24.)

p.66, Ls.7-25.)

there

ﬂ

and the center console.”

For safety reasons, Ofﬁcer Nordman had the driver and Ashbey get out of the

driving

t0 provide

After seeing the passenger’s identiﬁcation, Ofﬁcer

1:06.)

Ashbey from previous encounters.

weapon” that “appeared to be a pipe
(T12, p.65,

refused t0 provide his identiﬁcation. (EX.

initially

the freeway

a “lack 0f light” because Ofﬁcer

a spotlight,” so “[t]he only light provided

.

.

.

at a

high rate of speed”

Nordman was

was from

car.

(TL,

Ls.1-4); the cars

(T12, p.66,

Ls.10-23); and

“driving an undercover vehicle Without

[his] vehicle’s

headlights and [his] handheld

ﬂashlight.” (TL, p.66, Ls.5-23.)

Ofﬁcer Nordman asked the driver
undercover vehicle. (EX.

A at 2:20 — 2:25;

ﬂ

A at

1:46

t0 get out ﬁrst

and walked her

— 2:25.) At about that same

Tr., p.67, Ls.12-16.)

time, Ofﬁcer

to the front

Bangs

Ofﬁcer Nordman asked Ofﬁcer Bangs

arrived. (EX.

t0 get

out 0f the car and t0 “conduct an exterior sniff of the vehicle using his canine.” (EX.

— p.68,

L.3.)

driver t0 search her person.

(EX.

2:25; Tr., p.67, L.17

inside of the driver’s coin pocket.

found

it

in her

Ofﬁcer Nordman then asked

A

at

3:00

(EX.

A

—

at

3:05.)

3:50

bathroom and did not know what

it

—

A

for

of his

Ashbey

A at 2:20 —

and received consent from the

search of the driver revealed a blue pill

4:01, 5:12

was. (EX.

—

5:18.)

The

driver claimed she

A at 3:50 — 4:01, 5:15 — 5:22.)

After searching the driver, Ofﬁcer

Nordman took

her off the road to where Ofﬁcer Bangs

had brought Ashbey and asked both Ashbey and the driver
the road. (EX.

A at 4:58 — 5: 10.)

to

back up a

little

further

away from

The following conversation then occurred:

OFFICER NORDMAN:

Nothing

ASHBEY AND DRIVER:

[shaking heads]

OFFICER NORDMAN:

And

illegal inside

of the vehicle?

you’re unsure of the blue

pill that

was found

inside of your coin pocket?

DRIVER:

No.

OFFICER NORDMAN:

OK.

DRIVER:

Like

I

don’t

I

said, I

to 100k

OFFICER NORDMAN:

OK,

[Ofﬁcer Nordman turns to Ashbey

OFFICER NORDMAN:

it

know What that

is.

found it in my bathroom and I was going

up.

alright.

who was

Do me

holding his phone.]

a favor, dude? While we’re standing here,

I

do not want you 0n your phone. It’s an ofﬁcer safety
issue at this point. I don’t want you calling anybody,
texting

anybody—While you

are here.

Can we

agree

t0 that?

ASHBEY:

Yeah.

OFFICER NORDMAN:

Thank you.

DRIVER:

Can

I

like, if I didn’t

know,

use

my blinker,

what’s

going 0n?

OFFICER NORDMAN:

So

right

now, we’re

just going t0

make

sure there’s

nothing else inside of the vehicle, so he’s going t0
use his canine partner. If the dog doesn’t alert to the
vehicle then you’re on your way. If he does alert t0
the vehicle

OK?

But

it

does warrant us a search of the vehicle.
nothing in there, you have

if there’s

nothing t0 worry about.
(EX.

A at 5:08 — 6:00.)
While Ofﬁcer Nordman ﬁnished his

A at 5:55 — 6:01

.)

last sentence, the

A search 0f the vehicle produced “[a]

drug dog alerted to the vehicle. (EX.

clear plastic

baggy with what appeared

to

be trace amounts of methamphetamine in between the center console and the front passenger’s

seat

0n the ﬂoorboard.”

(Tr., p.55,

Rather than arrest Ashbey, Ofﬁcer

Ls.16-25.)

submitted a report 0f What happened to the Kootenai County Prosecutor’s Ofﬁce

and secured a warrant for Ashbey’s

On

February

arrest warrant.

6,

L23 — p.59,

(TL, p.56, L.1

— p.57,

Who then

sought

L.19.)

2019, the surveillance team saw Ashbey and arrested him pursuant t0 the

(TL, p.57, L.23

transaction card with

arrest.

Nordman

someone

L.8, p.80, Ls.7-1

1,

—

p.58, L.2.)

else’s

A search incident to his arrest produced a ﬁnancial

name 0n

it,

a pipe, and a controlled substance.

(TL, p.58,

p.108, Ls.18-24.)

The next day, Ofﬁcer Moreno, a sheriff s deputy working

in the jail, searched the jail unit

where Ashbey was staying based on information received from a conﬁdential informant.
p.82, Ls.11

—

p.83, L.2.)

Ofﬁcer Moreno found “a clear

substance.” (TL, p.83, Ls.3-1

Based on this

series

case, the state charged

plastic

baggy With a black

(TL,

tar-like

1.)

of events, the

state

charged Ashbey in three different cases. In the ﬁrst

Ashbey With possession of a

controlled substance based

on the substance

found during the trafﬁc stop 0n December 21, 2018. (No. 47251 R., p.48.) In the second case, the
state

charged Ashbey with grand theft by possession 0f a stolen ﬁnancial transaction card,

possession of a controlled substance, and possession of drug paraphernalia based 0n the ﬁnancial
transaction card, pipe, and controlled substance found in the search incident to arrest conducted

2019.

(No. 47252 R., pp.69-71.)

The

charged him with intimidating a

February

6,

Witness.

(N0. 47252 R., p.70.) In the third case, the state charged

state also

Ashbey with possession of a

controlled substance and introducing contraband into a correctional facility based

found in Ashbey’s belongings in the jail on February

7,

0n

on the substance

2019. (No. 47253 R., pp.47-48.)

Ashbey moved
argued Ofﬁcer

Nordman extended

Amendment and
poisonous

tree.

district court

trafﬁc stop

t0 suppress the evidence supporting the charges in all three cases.

that the evidence

the trafﬁc stop

on December 21

in Violation

found 0n February 6 and February 7 was

He

of the Fourth

all fruit

from

that

(No. 47251 R., pp.50-58; N0. 47252 R., pp.78-86; No. 47253 R., pp.58-69.) The

denied

all

three motions after

ﬁnding Ofﬁcer Nordman did not unlawfully extend the

on December 21. (TL, p.89, L.4 —

Ashbey timely appealed

p.1 16,

in all three cases.

pp.145-48; No. 47253 R., pp.106-09.)

L20.)
(N0. 47251 R., pp.98-102; No. 47252 R.,

M
0n appeal

Ashbey

states the issue

Did the

district court err in

as:

denying Mr. Ashbey’s motions t0 suppress?

(Appellant’s brief, p.8.)

The

state rephrases the issue as:

Has Ashbey

failed t0

show

the district court erred in denying his motions t0 suppress?

ARGUMENT
Ashbev Failed T0 Show The
A.

Court Erred

District

When It Denied His

Motions T0 Suppress

Introduction

The

district court

the trafﬁc stop

properly found Ofﬁcer

0n December 2 1 2018.
,

trafﬁc stop only

when he

takes

Nordman

did not unlawfully extend the length 0f

An ofﬁcer violates the Fourth Amendment by extending a

more time than reasonably necessary

t0

complete the stop 0r

abandons the trafﬁc stop in favor of a different investigation unsupported by reasonable suspicion.

From
car,

the time Ofﬁcer

Nordman
Ashbey

including the ﬁfty seconds

mission 0f the trafﬁc stop.

search,

and

targets

0n appeal, Ofﬁcer Nordman was engaged

by

(1) asking

about an unidentiﬁable blue

(3) instructing

Ashbey not t0

answered a question from the

pill

call or text

driver, but that

Whether there was anything

during those ﬁfty seconds, Ofﬁcer

stop

to the evidence obtained

is fruit

0f the allegedly

also providing cover for Ofﬁcer

also

extending the

Furthermore, the mere fact

0n February 6 and February

illegal trafﬁc stop

fruit

Amendment,

suppress the evidence found 0n

Normand

Normand

that,

Bangs and

his

Amendment Violation.

0n December 21 destroys Ashbey’s

stop did not Violate the Fourth

illegal in the car,

during the trafﬁc stop. Ofﬁcer

does not count as Oﬂicer

Normand was

drug dog does not constitute a Fourth

evidence

in the

he found on the driver during a consensual

length of the stop because the driver chose t0 ask the question.

As

drug dog alerted 0n the

During Ashbey’s ﬁfty seconds, Ofﬁcer Nordman was performing

safety tasks related t0 the trafﬁc stop

(2) asking the driver

initiated the trafﬁc stop until the

December

Ashbey argues only

that the

on December 21. The legitimacy of the trafﬁc

0f the poisonous

this

7,

tree

argument. Because the trafﬁc

Court should afﬁrm the

district court’s refusal to

21, February 6, and February 7.

Standard

B.

Of Review

This Court reviews a

district court’s

order resolving a motion t0 suppress “using a

bifurcated standard 0f review.” State V. Huffaker, 160 Idaho 400, 404, 374 P.3d 563, 567 (2016).

“This Court accepts the

trial

court’s ﬁndings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous, but

freely review the trial court’s application of constitutional principles in light 0f those facts.”

I_d.

Ashbev Has Failed T0 Show Any Violation Of The Fourth Amendment

C.

Ashbey has

failed t0

Amendment prohibits
the appropriate

show Ofﬁcer Nordman

violated the Fourth

Amendment. The Fourth

“unreasonable searches and seizures.” U.S. Const. amend. IV. Generally,

remedy

for a Fourth

Amendment

evidence obtained as a direct result of an
later

may

illegal

discovered and found to be derivative of an

Violation

is

“the suppression of both ‘primary

search 0r seizure’ and, pertinent here, ‘evidence
proverbial

illegality,’ the

‘fruit

of the poisonous

tree.” State V. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 720, 404 P.3d 659, 662 (2017) (quoting Seggra V. United

m,

468 U.S. 796, 804

(1 984)).

The

district court

because there was no Violation of the Fourth
the immediate 0r derivative fruit of Ofﬁcer

1.

Amendment and

thus

no proverbial poison

to taint

Nordman’s conduct.

The December 21 Trafﬁc Stop Did Not Violate The Fourth Amendment

Ashbey has
trafﬁc stop.

properly denied Ashbey’s motions to suppress

failed t0

show that Ofﬁcer Nordman impermissibly extended the December 21

“The seizure 0f a vehicle’s occupants

in order t0 investigate a trafﬁc Violation is a

Amendment

so long as the seizing ofﬁcer had reasonable

‘reasonable seizure’ under the Fourth

suspicion that a Violation occurred.” State V. Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608, 389 P.3d 150, 153 (2016).

The

seizure

may last as long as “necessary t0 effectuate the purpose of the

460 U.S. 491, 500 (1983);

ﬂ

Rodriguez

V.

United States, 135

duration of the stop crosses the constitutional line only

when

it

S. Ct.

stop.” Florida V. Royal“,

1609, 1614 (2015).

The

“exceed[s] the time needed to

handle the matter for which the stop was made.” Rodriguez, 135

Idaho

at

S. Ct. at

1612;

ﬂ M,

161

608, 389 P.3d at 153.

Regardless 0fthe speciﬁc trafﬁc infraction underlying the trafﬁc stop, “an ofﬁcer’s mission
includes ‘ordinary inquiries incident to [the trafﬁc] stop.”’ Rodriguez, 135 S. Ct. at 1615 (quoting

Illinois V. Caballes,

543 U.S. 405, 409 (2005)).

driver’s license, determining

“Typically such inquiries involve checking the

Whether there are outstanding warrants against the

driver,

and

inspecting the automobile’s registration and proof of insurance.” Li. These inquiries are always

considered part of the trafﬁc-stop mission because they have a “close connection t0 roadway
safety” and help “ensur[e] that vehicles

on the road

are operated safely

and responsibly.”

I_d.

In addition t0 allowing the completion of these “tasks tied to the trafﬁc infraction,” the

Fourth

Amendment “tolerate[s]

detention.”

Li. at 1614.

contraband.

E

dog

sniff

certain unrelated investigations that d[o] not lengthen the roadside

These unrelated investigations include using a drug dog

Caballes, 543 U.S. at

was performed 0n

trafﬁc Violation”);

M,

Court “allow[s] for dog

t0 sniff for

409 (ﬁnding no Violation 0f Fourth Amendment where “the

was lawﬁllly seized

the exterior of respondent’s car While he

for a

161 Idaho at 609 n.1, 389 P.3d at 154 n.1 (recognizing the U.S. Supreme

sniffs that

do not add time

to the stop”); State V.

McGraw, 163 Idaho

736,

_, 418 P.3d 1245, 1249-50 (Ct. App. 2018) (holding drug dog sniff of car did not impermissibly
extend a trafﬁc stop because
the test

is

it

occurred while a second ofﬁcer wrote the trafﬁc citation). Because

whether the unrelated investigation lengthened the trafﬁc

stop, the

Fourth

Amendment

allows an ofﬁcer t0 simultaneously engage in the trafﬁc investigation and the unrelated
investigation, so long as the ofﬁcer does not

State V. Renteria, 163 Idaho 545,

abandon the former

in favor

of the

latter.

E, gg,

_, 415 P.3d 954, 958 (Ct. App. 2018) (holding patrol ofﬁcer

did not impermissibly extend a trafﬁc stop

by discussing potential drug

activity with canine ofﬁcer

because “he was

still

in his patrol car awaiting a response

McGraW, 163 Idaho

Renteria’s driving privileges”);

principled basis for holding that the Fourth

at

from dispatch as

741, 418 P.3d at 1250

Amendment

engaged

dutifully

Nordman

Nordman prolonged

.”
.

.

.

He

was

drug dog alerted 0n the

car.

is

is

up

until the time the

limited to a narrow

window 0f time: he

alleges only that

trafﬁc stop. “[T]he mission of a trafﬁc stop

556

and attend
(Ct.

t0 related safely

is ‘to

concerns.” State

V.

attending t0 safety concerns related t0 the trafﬁc stop

Ofﬁcer Nordman engaged

in the car, tried t0 determine the nature

3

Ashbey

When he

to call or text anyone. (EX.

asked for consent to
footing.

ofﬁcer

See State

may “order[]

pill

354) (holding ofﬁcer was

of the trafﬁc stop during those ﬁfty
if there

was anything

illegal

found in the driver’s pocket, and instructed

Nordman

Ashbey and the driver
search—and searched—the

V.

at

A at 5:10 — 5:33.)

thus implicitly concedes that Ofﬁcer
ﬁrst spoke With

of the

when he questioned the defendant about her

in the mission

0f the blue

in the mission

Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 481, 362 P.3d 551,

seconds by attending to related safety concerns. Speciﬁcally he asked

Ashbey not

alerted.”3

address the trafﬁc Violation that warranted the

App. 2015) (emphasis added) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S.

nervousness).

dog

Ofﬁcer

wrong.

Ofﬁcer Nordman spent the ﬁrst part of those ﬁfty seconds engaged

stop

n0

(emphasis in original».

the stop in the “approximately 50 seconds[] before the

(Appellant’s brief, p. 12.)

also see

did not impermissibly prolong the trafﬁc stop because he

in the trafﬁc investigation

Ashbey’s challenge 0n appeal

(“We

0f

precludes one ofﬁcer from pursuing the

purpose of a stop while providing cover t0 another ofﬁcer on-scene
Here, Ofﬁcer

to the validity

did not impermissibly prolong the stop

at the car,

driver.

asked them t0 get out of the

car,

and

His implied concession has strong legal

Burgess, 165 Idaho 109, 112, 440 P.3d 455, 458 (Ct. App. 2018) (noting

all

occupants of a vehicle, driver and passengers, t0 exit a stopped vehicle as

a precautionary measure to protect the ofﬁcer’s safety”); State V. Ramirez, 145 Idaho 886, 891,

187 P.3d 1261, 1266

(Ct.

App. 2008) (“A mere brief request

for consent t0 a search during 0r at

the conclusion of an otherwise valid detention does not impermissibly extend a trafﬁc stop”).

10

Ofﬁcer Nordman’s question whether there was anything
scope of a safety concern related to the trafﬁc stop.

E

illegal in the car fell

United States

V.

within the

Buzzard, 395 F. Supp.

3d 750, 754 (S.D.W.V. 2019) (holding ofﬁcer’s question “Whether there was anything
the car”

was

illegal in

“related to the mission 0f the [trafﬁc] stop itself”). For example, an honest response

t0 that question

would reveal Whether

used against Ofﬁcer Nordman or
her ability to drive.

E

there

illegal

were any

illegal

weapons

substances being consumed

State V. Floyd,

in the vehicle that could

by the

be

driver that could affect

898 N.W.2d 560, 569-70 (Wis. 2017) (ﬁnding ofﬁcer’s

questions regarding whether the defendant “had any weapons” were “related t0 ofﬁcer safety and

were negligibly burdensome” and “were part 0f the trafﬁc stop’s mission, and so did not cause an
extension”).

The question was

seen a makeshift

(E

pocket.

weapon

Tr., p.65,

especially appropriate here given that

in the car

Ls.16-24; EX.

Ofﬁcer Nordman’s attempt

Ofﬁcer Nordman had already

and retrieved an unidentiﬁable blue

pill

from the

driver’s

A at 3:50 — 4:01.)

to identify the blue pill

found on the driver also

fell

within the

scope of a safety concern related t0 the trafﬁc stop. Having just found a single unidentiﬁable

on the

driver,

Ofﬁcer Nordman did not

stray

pill

from the mission 0f the trafﬁc stop by asking the

driver to identify the pill so that he could determine whether

it

was a substance

that could affect

her driving—and, if necessary, determine Whether she had recently taken any such pills—prior t0
the driver getting

(stating

back

in the car

and driving onto the

interstate.

E

Rodriggez, 575 U.S.

at

355

mission of a trafﬁc stop includes “ensuring that vehicles 0n the road are operated safely

and responsibly”).4

4

Ofﬁcer Nordman could also seek

0f his consensual search of the driver.
1266 (“A mere brief request for consent t0 a search
during or at the conclusion 0f an otherwise valid detention does not impermissibly extend a trafﬁc
stop.”). It would make little sense if the Fourth Amendment allowed an ofﬁcer to ask for consent

E
t0

Ramirez, 145 Idaho

search—and

t0

at 891,

this clariﬁcation as part

187 P.3d

at

search—an individual Without impermissibly lengthening

11

the stop, but forbid

Ofﬁcer Nordman was also acting out of a concern
stop

m

When he

instructed

Rodriguez, 575 U.S.

so an ofﬁcer

Ashbey not
at

make any

to

calls or

for ofﬁcer safety related t0 the trafﬁc

send any text messages 0n his phone.

356 (“Trafﬁc stops are especially fraught With danger t0 police ofﬁcers,

may need to take

certain negligibly

burdensome precautions

mission safely.” (internal quotations and citation omitted»; Milledge
(S.C. 2018) (“Milledge’s attempt t0

make

in order t0

V. State,

complete his

811 S.E.2d 796, 803

a phone call during the trafﬁc stop

was a

relevant

consideration in determining whether he posed a threat to ofﬁcer safety”).

The

rest

of the ﬁfty seconds

at issue

were taken up by the driver asking Ofﬁcer Nordman

about the dog and Ofﬁcer Nordman answering the driver’s question. (EX.
period 0f time has n0 bearing on whether Ojﬁcer

because

WL

it

was

374362,

the driver

at

Who

Nordman impermissibly prolonged

chose t0 ask a question. Accord State

V.

That

the stop

Dewitt, No. 46524, 2020

*4 (Idaho Ct. App. January 23, 2020) (“The fact that Dewitt chose to ﬁnd his

prescription medication bottle and chose t0

analysis

A at 5:34 — 6:00.)

hand

it

over t0 the trooper has n0 bearing 0n our

of whether Trooper Marrott extended Dewitt’s stop in Violation 0f the Fourth

Amendment”). Surely the Fourth Amendment—Whose touchstone

is

reasonableness, after a11—

does not require an ofﬁcer to ignore a driver he has stopped simply because she asks a question
unrelated t0 the purpose 0fthe stop.

(“[R]easonablness

is

(EX.

Birchﬁeld V. North Dakota, 136

always the touchstone 0f Fourth

Before Ofﬁcer
car.

ﬂ

Nordman ﬁnished answering

A at 5:40 — 6:01.)

Once

the

dog

Amendment

S. Ct.

analysis.”).

the driver’s question, the

alerted, the

Fourth

2 1 60, 2186 (2016)

Amendment no

dog

alerted to the

longer had

its

eye

on the Linze stopwatch because the ofﬁcers had probable cause and could search the car for drugs.

that

same ofﬁcer from giving

the individual an opportunity t0 explain an obj ect found during the

search that the ofﬁcer cannot identify but that could be either dangerous 0r

12

illegal.

State V. Tucker, 132 Idaho 841, 843,

979 P.2d 1199, 1201 (1999) (“[A]n ofﬁcer’s investigation

the scene 0f a stopped automobile can ripen into probable cause as soon as a drug detection

alerts

on the

at

dog

exterior of the vehicle, justifying a search of the vehicle Without the necessity of

obtaining a warrant”).

Ashbey claims Ofﬁcer Nordman abandoned
(Appellant’s brief, pp.10-12.)

dog.

Ofﬁcer Bangs

to

He

relies

the trafﬁc investigation t0 help With the drug

0n Ofﬁcer Nordman’s testimony

that

he “allowed

conduct his exterior sniff 0f the vehicle While [Ofﬁcer Nordman] essentially was

—

safety” (Tr., p.69, L.15

p.70, L.5) and

0n the

district court’s

ﬁnding

that, “rather

than running

the driver’s license and other identifying information regarding the defendant and the driver,

[Ashbey] chose to stand and act as cover for Ofﬁcer Bangs while he had the canine d0 the search”
(T12,

Both of those statements show Ofﬁcer Nordman

p.102, Ls.2-12).

drug investigation, but neither 0f those statements show Ofﬁcer

There

investigation.

no reason—including the Fourth

is

started helping With the

Nordman abandoned

Amendment—why Ofﬁcer Nordman

could not help protect Ofﬁcer Bangs while he pursued the trafﬁc Violation.

Idaho

at

741, 418 P.3d at 1250

Amendment

(“We

also see

no principled basis

.”
.

.

.

(emphasis in original».

McGraW, 163

for holding that the Fourth

And that is precisely what Ofﬁcer Nordman

did

When he asked

pill

found in the driver’s pocket, and instructed Ashbey not t0

Nordman was
dog

ﬂ

precludes one ofﬁcer from pursuing the purpose 0f a stop while providing cover to

another ofﬁcer on-scene

the drug

the trafﬁc

if there

was anything

illegal in the car, tried t0

determine the nature of the blue

call or text

anyone. Because Ofﬁcer

continuously engaged in the trafﬁc investigation from the initiation of the stop until

alerted,

he did not Violate the Fourth Amendment.

Moreover, even
not Violate the Fourth

if

Ofﬁcer Nordman abandoned the purpose of the trafﬁc

Amendment because

stop,

the record supports the district court’s

13

he

still

ﬁnding

did

that

Ofﬁcer Nordman developed reasonable suspicion of a drug crime prior

“A

the trafﬁc stop.

Fourth

Amendment

activity.

to the alleged extension

of

drug dog sniff may be performed during a trafﬁc stop Without Violating the

.

.

if

.

any extension 0f the stop

is

justiﬁed

State V. Kelley, 159 Idaho 417, 424, 361 P.3d 1280,

by reasonable suspicion” of drug

1287

(Ct.

App. 2015). “Reasonable

suspicion must be based on speciﬁc, articulable facts and the rational inferences that can be drawn

from those

facts.” State V. Bishop,

Here, after Ofﬁcer

seconds

at issue, the

146 Idaho 804, 81

Nordman stopped

1,

203 P.3d 1203, 1210 (2009).

the car for a trafﬁc Violation but prior to the ﬁfty

information he had about a possible drug crime evolved into reasonable

Prior t0 the ﬁfty seconds at issue, Ofﬁcer

suspicion.

Nordman knew

(1) the ofﬁcers

“had

information that [an apartment] was being used as a place where people could purchase narcotics
and/or use narcotics” (Tr., p.95, Ls.5-13); (2) the same sources

number

building and apartment

came from

the car was the

L.2

— p.63,

p.98, L.4);

L.1

provided the address of the

two names of individuals trafﬁcking drugs

“one of which was Robert Ashbey” (TL, p.95, Ls.5-13);

at that location,

the car both

also gave the ofﬁcers

who

the

“known narcotics

same Robert Ashbey that the
1); (5)

and

(6)

the driver and

A

at

3:50

street sources

Ashbey had

inferences that could reasonably be

—

two individuals

in

location” (TL, p.53, Ls.16-21); (4) the passenger in

connected to drug trafﬁcking (TL, p.60,

a makeshift

weapon

Ofﬁcer Nordman found an unidentiﬁable blue

consensual search (EX.

(3) the

4:01, 5:12

—

5:18).5

drawn from these

facts

Taken

in the car (Tr., p.97, L.23

pill

—

0n the driver during a

together, these facts

provided Ofﬁcer

and the

Nordman reasonable

5

The driver’s (somewhat curious) explanation of the pill—that she found it 0n her counter and
was holding onto it so she could look it up online and identify it—did not affect the reasonable
State V. Perez, 164 Idaho 626, 628, 434 P.3d 801, 803 (2019) (“[W]hile
suspicion analysis.
conduct might be explained by another cause, the Supreme Court 0f the United States has

E

‘consistently recognized that reasonable suspicion

need not rule out the possibility of innocent

conduct.’” (quoting Navarette V. California, 572 U.S. 393, 403 (2014»).

14

suspicion a drug crime

was

afoot.

That reasonable suspicion allowed Ofﬁcer Nordman t0 extend

the trafﬁc stop in order t0 conduct a drug

dog

ﬂ

sniff.

1287. Thus, even if true, Ashbey’s allegation that Ofﬁcer

would not prove a

trafﬁc stop

159 Idaho

Ke_lley,

424, 361 P.3d at

at

Nordman abandoned the purpose 0f the

Amendment.

Violation of the Fourth

The Evidence Obtained On February 6 And February 7 Should Not Be Suppressed

2.

The

properly denied Ashbey’s attempt to suppress the evidence obtained on

district court

February 6 and February

7.

On appeal, Ashbey does not argue that the searches on February 6

February 7 constituted separate Violations of the Fourth Amendment. (Appellant’s
Instead,

fruit

Ashbey argues

for the suppression of the February evidence because,

of the poisonous December 21 trafﬁc stop.

above, the

December 21

(E Appellant’s

trafﬁc stop did not Violate the Fourth

Amendment.

brief, p.19.)

Ashbey

brief, p.19.)

and

claims,

it is

But, as explained

ﬂ

Part C.1. Thus,

the district court properly refused t0 suppress the February evidence.

The Attenuation Doctrine Applies T0 The Evidence Obtained On February 7

3.

Even
afﬁrm the

if the

December 21

district court’s

S. Ct.

States

6

is

this

Court should

decision not t0 suppress the evidence found 0n February 7 because the

attenuation doctrine applies.6

Amendment

Amendment,

trafﬁc stop violated the Fourth

The

“principal judicial

remedy”

for a Violation of the Fourth

“t0 exclude unlawfully seized evidence in a criminal trial.”

Utah

V. Strieff,

136

2056, 2061 (2016). “But the signiﬁcant costs of [the exclusionary rule] have led [the United

Supreme Court]

to

deem

The attenuation doctrine

it

‘applicable only

.

.

.

where

its

deterrence beneﬁts outweigh

also applies t0 the evidence obtained

recognizes the prosecutor did not

make an

on February

6,

its

but the state

attenuation argument with respect to the February 6

ﬂ

(E

district court.
also State V. Gonzalez, 165
N0. 47252 R., pp.97-103);
Idaho 95, 99, 439 P.3d 1267, 1271 (2019) (“T0 be clear, both the issue and the party’s position on
the issue must be raised before the trial court for it t0 be properly preserved for appeal.”).

evidence in the

15

substantial social costs.”’

Li. (ellipsis in original) (quoting

Hudson

V.

Michigan, 547 U.S. 586,

591 (2006)). The Court has “accordingly recognized several exceptions t0 the rule.” Li.

The

attenuation exception precludes application of the exclusionary rule

Where the

can show “the connection between unlawful conduct and the discovery 0f evidence

is

state

‘sufﬁciently

attenuated t0 dissipate the taint.” Li. at 2062. Three factors guide the attenuation analysis: “(1)
the elapsed time

between the misconduct and the acquisition 0f the evidence,

0f intervening circumstances, and

(3) the

(2) the occurrence

ﬂagrancy and purpose of the improper law enforcement

action.” State V. Page, 140 Idaho 841, 846, 103 P.3d 454,

459 (2004). A11 three

factors

weigh

favor of applying the attenuation exception t0 the evidence recovered in the jail 0n February

First,

is

in

7.

m

temporal proximity weighs in favor of attenuation. “[T]he period of time t0 consider

‘the elapsed

time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence.”

Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 722, 404 P.3d 659, 664 (2017).

9

Here, the only alleged misconduct

occurred on December 21, 2018, and the acquisition 0f evidence in the jail occurred 0n February

7,

2019. The nearlyﬁfty days between these dates weighs in favor 0f attenuation.

States V.

Reed, 776 F. App’x 240, 241

(5th Cir.

Sgt gg,

M

2019) (holding temporal proximity of

approximately three days “constitute[s] a ‘substantial period 0f time’ favoring attenuation”);

United States

V.

Gross, 662 F.3d 393, 402 (6th Cir. 201 1) (holding temporal proximity of two

months “weighs signiﬁcantly toward

attenuation”).

Second, the occurrence of intervening circumstances weighs in favor of attenuation.

An

intervening circumstance interrupts the connection between unconstitutional police conduct and
the discovery 0f evidence, “so that ‘the interest protected

by

the constitutional guarantee that has

been violated would not be served by suppression of the evidence 0btained.”’
at

2061 (quoting Hudson

V.

M,

136

S. Ct.

Michigan, 547 U.S. 586, 593 (2006)). The defendant’s commission

16

of an independent crime counts as an intervening circumstance. See,

460 F.3d 963, 967 (8th

Cir.

1g” United

States V. Sledge,

2006) (refusing to apply exclusionary rule t0 unlawful detention

because the defendant “committed a new, distinct crime, thereby permitting the ofﬁcers lawfully
to arrest him”); State V. Williams,

926 A.2d 340, 350 (NJ. 2007)

(“[I]t

would be farfetched

believe that police ofﬁcers Will attempt suspicionless investigatory stops

suspect Will

commit an independent crime

.

.

.

in the

hope

that a

be the basis for a lawful search”). So too does

that Will

a subsequent lawful search supported by information unrelated to the unlawful police activity,

gg,

State V.

Thomas, 834 S.E.2d 654, 662 (N.C.

conducted by a third party,

App. 2017) (“[A]
In

ﬂ

gg,

M,

Ct.

413 P.3d 419, 423

Li.

at 660.

(Ct.

ofﬁcers investigating the defendant 0n suspicions that he had committed

The ofﬁcers used

the

They received permission from

obtained a search warrant.

I_d.

As

pointing a riﬂe in their direction.

phone records
the

t0 locate the

home’s owner

the ofﬁcers

t0 enter

walked down the

Li After the defendant ﬁred

defendant and recovered evidence from the home. Li.
the use of the

is

can also constitute an intervening circumstance”).

multiple murders obtained phone records for the defendant’s cell phone Without a warrant.

S.E.2d

ﬂ

App. 2019), especially Where the search

State V. Fenton, 163 Idaho 318, 322,

third party’s discretionary act

to

at

house where the defendant

834

lived.

and ﬁnd the defendant and also
stairwell, they

M

saw

the defendant

three shots, the ofﬁcers seized the

660-61. The

court assumed that

phone records Without a warrant violated the Fourth Amendment but refused

to

suppress the evidence recovered on the basis that the attenuation doctrine applied. Li. at 661. The
court found that “the defendant’s separate crime 0f pointing a loaded gun at an ofﬁcer and pulling
the trigger constituted an intervening circumstance under the attenuation doctrine.” Li. at 661-62.

The court

also found the search of the

home

constituted an intervening circumstance because the

ofﬁcers used information unrelated t0 the phone records as the basis for the search: the consent 0f

17

the

homeowner and

a search warrant. Li;

ﬂ m,

163 Idaho

at

322, 413 P.3d at 423 (holding

probation ofﬁcer’s search 0f defendant based 0n his probation status constituted an intervening

circumstance because “the probation ofﬁcer was from a separate agency and was not involved in
the illegal stop”).

defendant in

M,

m

Similar to

two events here

Who committed

constitute intervening circumstances.

a “separate crime”

committed a separate crime when he voluntarily chose

two months

after the allegedly

And

unlawful search.

When he

Like the

shot at the ofﬁcers,

M

to possess heroin inside

like the ofﬁcers in

Ashbey

0f the jail almost

who

relied

on

information unrelated to the phone records as the basis for their search of the home, Ofﬁcer

Moreno

relied

on information unrelated

t0 the

December 21 search

as the basis for his search 0f

Ashbey’s belongings in the jail. Speciﬁcally, Ofﬁcer Moreno relied 0n information provided by
a conﬁdential informant in the

ofﬁcer in

m,

(TL, p.82, L.22

jail.

—

p.83, L.2.) Furthermore, like the probation

Ofﬁcer Moreno “was from a separate agency and was not involved

m,

[allegedly] illegal stop.”

163 Idaho

at

322, 413 P.3d at 423.

heavily in the State’s favor for ﬁnding attenuation.”

Nordman

Third, if Ofﬁcer

m,

violated the Fourth

“A11 0f these facts weigh

834 S.E.2d

Amendment,

in the

at 662.

the Violation

was

neither

purposeful nor ﬂagrant. The third factor 0f the attenuation doctrine favors “exclusion only
the police misconduct

“good-faith mistakes.”

.

.

.

is

when

purposeful or ﬂagrant” as opposed t0 merely “negligent” 0r based 0n

M,

136

S. Ct. at

2063.

drug house saw the defendant leave the house.

I_d.

In

at

M,

an ofﬁcer surveilling a suspected

2059. The ofﬁcer detained the defendant,

asked t0 see his identiﬁcation, discovered the defendant had an outstanding warrant, arrested the
defendant, and found methamphetamine 0n the defendant in a search pursuant to his arrest.

The U.S. Supreme Court found

the initial stop violated the Fourth

18

Amendment

Li

but reﬁlsed t0

suppress the methamphetamine because

it

found the attenuation doctrine applied.

Li. at

2063. The

Court found the third factor of the attenuation doctrine weighed in favor of attenuation because
the ofﬁcer

“was

at

most negligent.”

I_d.

The Court reasoned

that the stop “occurred in connection

with a bona ﬁde investigation into a drug house” and that the ofﬁcer simply “made two good-faith
mistakes”: he stopped the defendant Without

Visitor

knowing Whether the defendant was a short-term

0f the suspected drug house (and thus more likely t0 be engaged in a drug transaction) and

he immediately detained the defendant rather than request that the defendant speak with him. Li

Ofﬁcer Nordman,

Nordman and
Li And,

if

like the

ofﬁcer in

m,

Mwere engaged

the ofﬁcer in

“was

in “a

at

most negligent.”

bona ﬁde investigation

Li.

into a drug house.”

Ofﬁcer Nordman violated the Fourth Amendment by detaining Ashbey without a

was n0 more culpable than

sufﬁcient factual basis, he

the ofﬁcer in Strieff

Who

defendant Without a sufﬁcient factual basis. Furthermore, unlike the ofﬁcer in
solely with the “purpose

.

.

.

to

‘ﬁnd out what was going 0n

[in]

motivated by more than just a desire t0 discover evidence.
record shows Ofﬁcer

Nordman

in part, for the safety

of Ofﬁcer Bangs. (Appellant’s

made any

Both Ofﬁcer

stayed With the driver and

the

Li.

detained the

Mwho

acted

house,” Ofﬁcer Nordman was

As even Ashbey

Ashbey on

concedes, the

the side 0f the road, at least

brief, pp.1 1-12.)

Thus,

if

Ofﬁcer Nordman

mistakes, his “errors in judgment hardly rise t0 a purposeful 0r ﬂagrant Violation of

[Ashbey’s] Fourth

Amendment rights.”

m,

At bottom,

the only connection

between Ofﬁcer Nordman’s allegedly unlawful conduct

and the evidence found 0n February 7

is

that

a chain of events that eventually led to
occurred.

No

court,

136

S. Ct. at

2063.

Ofﬁcer Nordman’s allegedly unlawful conduct

Ashbey being

in the jail

Where the February 7 search

however, has held that mere “but for” causation

transfer the taint ofunlawful police

started

is

a sufﬁcient connection to

misconduct t0 evidence discovered a few links down the causal

19

chain. In fact,

many courts have held the

opposite.

Sﬂl gg, United

268, 276 (1978) (“Even in situations Where the exclusionary rule
declined to adopt a ‘per se or but for rule’ that would
tangible or live-witness testimony,

began with an

illegal arrest”);

make

which somehow came

United States

is

States V. Ceccolini,

435 U.S.

plainly applicable,

we have

inadmissible any evidence, Whether

t0 light

through a chain of causation that

Mendez, 885 F.3d 899, 909 (5th

V.

Cir.

2018)

Amendment Violation even where

(“Evidence

may be

Violation

a but—for cause 0f the discovery 0f the evidence”); United States V. Larios, 640 F.2d

is

sufﬁciently attenuated from the Fourth

the

938, 941 (9th Cir. 1981) (refusing to apply “a ‘but for’ test” because “that has been rejected”
the U.S.

Supreme

afﬁrm the

Court). Because

all

district court’s refusal to

search regardless of whether

December 21

it

three factors

weigh

in favor

of attenuation,

this

by

Court should

suppress the evidence obtained during the February 7

jail

ﬁnds Ofﬁcer Nordman violated the Fourth Amendment during the

trafﬁc stop.

CONCLUSION
The

state respectﬁllly requests this

Court afﬁrm the

district court’s

motions t0 suppress and afﬁrm Ashbey’s judgments of conviction.

DATED this 7th day 0f August, 2020.

Jeff Nye

/s/

JEFF NYE
Deputy Attorney General
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order denying Ashbey’s
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